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Abstract: Detecting malicious peers is a challenging task in peer-to-peer networks due to their decentralized structure
and lack of central authority. Trust models can help identify malicious peers by maintaining information about peer
relations and interactions. Keeping information about trust relations helps to reduce risks when providing or using
services. This paper introduces two consistency concepts in trust management. Feedback consistency is used to evaluate
how consistent feedback is with respect to past feedbacks. On the other side, peer consistency measures consistency
of a peer’s past feedbacks. These metrics help to reduce malicious interactions and increase successful downloads.
Furthermore, the model oﬀers better service quality for good peers by using consistency metrics. A file-sharing application
is implemented on a simulation environment. The proposed model can eﬀectively reduce the malicious download rate,
even in 50% malicious environments, and increases successful download rates.
Key words: Peer-to-peer systems, trust models, peer consistency, feedback consistency

1. Introduction
With the rapid growth of the Internet community, server-based centralized solutions are having diﬃculties
satisfying the increasing demands of clients on network bandwidth and hardware capabilities. Peer-to-peer
(P2P) networks can provide scalable decentralized solutions by distributing network traﬃc and processing costs
to peers. CPU- or disc-sharing networks, content-sharing platforms, file-distribution platforms, and many other
systems are implemented as P2P systems to overcome problems of server-based solutions. However, malicious
peers may degrade the eﬀectiveness of P2P systems. In addition to sharing services, peers can share experiences
about provided services to decrease activities of malicious peers. Thus, each peer could have the opportunity
to evaluate another peer by using other peers’ experiences, even without knowing about the evaluated peer.
A peer may collect feedbacks of others and combine them with its own experience to calculate trust- and
reputation-related metrics. Since some feedback providers might be malicious, the calculation of metrics can be
challenging. A trust model should consider such cases and provide robust metrics to make trusting decisions
about service providers.
We propose a consistency-based trust model to identify malicious peers by using feedback consistency and
peer consistency metrics. Feedback consistency evaluates how consistent a feedback about a peer is compared to
previous feedbacks. Thus, malicious feedbacks can be detected and their importance in trust calculation can be
decreased. Furthermore, when a peer’s malicious feedbacks are detected, its peer consistency value is decreased.
In other words, peer consistency metric measures how good a peer is in providing feedbacks. This metric is
used by service providers when accepting service requests. If a service requester has low peer consistency, its
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feedback quality is considered low and then a service provider would more likely reject its requests. Furthermore,
peers with larger peer consistency values obtain better quality of service. The proposed model was tested on
the Peersim [1] simulation environment and produced robust results, even in extremely malicious environments
with a 50% malicious peer ratio.
In the rest of the paper, Section 2 discusses the related research. Section 3 explains the computational
model of the proposed approach. Section 4 defines the experimental model. Section 5 presents experimental
results. Section 6 concludes the study and gives possible future work directions.
2. Related work
At the beginning of the 21st century, centralized server systems started to be replaced by distributed systems.
P2P systems appeared as an approach to solve scalability issues in centralized systems. Due to the decentralized nature of P2P systems, trust management is an important part of these systems. Mathematical and
statistical approaches are frequently used to model trust management problems in P2P systems. According to
network type, P2P trust models are generally evaluated in two categories: distributed hash table (DHT)-based
approaches and unstructured network-based approaches.
In DHT-based approaches, global trust information about a peer is stored by an archiver peer, which
is selected by the DHT mechanism. Thus, the entire interaction history of a peer can be accessed from its
archiver via the DHT. Aberer et al.’s model [2] was the first study in the field, introducing the reputation-based
trust management concept and a DHT-based trust management algorithm. In this model, negative experiences
are shared on a P-grid structure. However, this approach ignores the diﬀerence between a new and an old
peer and makes the model vulnerable to whitewashing attacks. The Eigentrust model [3] calculates local and
global trust values iteratively based on Eigenvector calculation over a distributed and decentralized model.
The PeerTrust [4] model defined the concept of feedback credibility for the first time. PeerTrust has created
a strong belief in the evaluation of similarity. Through the concepts of transaction and community context
factor, modeling relationships can be customized according to semantics of transactions and community. Guo
et al. [5] keep similarity measurements in a vector and propose a method to compute the vector via time eﬀect.
Liu et al. [6] propose an approach to detect malicious feedbacks and measure service quality with integrality,
authenticity, and credibility metrics. FCTrust [7] uses a trust model based on feedback credibility for evaluating
the trustworthiness of participants.
In trust models on unstructured networks, a peer maintains trust information about peers interacted with
previously or peers in the neighborhood. Peers flood trust queries to their neighbors to learn trust information
about a peer and neighbors forward queries to their neighbors and so on. However, the trust value computed
from the collected data does not reflect opinions of all peers generally. The SORT [8] model manages trust
relations with historical data and feedbacks of neighbors. In that study, service and recommendation contexts
are defined and a service is evaluated with satisfaction, weight, and fading eﬀect parameters. Cornelli et al. [9]
proposed a model of reputation sharing, which is based on a distributed polling algorithm while maintaining
the requestor’s and provider’s anonymity. Selcuk et al. [10] focused on preventing malicious nodes and infected
content, as well as proposing a solution to safeguard the ownership and authentication of messages. Su et al. [11]
propose the ServiceTrust model to measure the quality of service. The changes in local trust values are measured
and credibility is imported from PeerTrust. Su et al. carried their work further with the ServiceTrust++ model
[12] and included decay factor, similarity, threshold, controlled randomness, and jump strategy to the model.
Beyond statistical approaches, some other methods are applied to trust management. Song et al. [13]
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calculated the local trust value of peers and the recommendation information by using a fuzzy logic inference
model. Tian et al. [14] proposed an evidence-theory–based fuzzy trust model that combined advanced fuzzy rules
with D-S evidence theory. FRTrust [15] applied a fuzzy model to cluster nodes based on semantic similarities
between their resources. Guo et al. [16] classified fuzzy data over the maximum tree with fuzzy clustering
for large-scale P2P networks to improve performance. GenTrust [17] evaluates service and reputation contexts
separately and uses peer and interaction features as input for genetic programming computation to detect
malicious peers. Liu et al. [18] proposed a trust model based on machine learning and used real datasets from
eBay and Allegro. They grouped features as features of a node from itself, features from other nodes, and
features of a service provided from a node.
3. Trust model
In the proposed trust model, each peer provides some resources or services and stores trust information about
other peers. Peers and resources are assumed to have unique ids. A peer starts interactions with others by
requesting their services. In an interaction, a peer becomes a provider peer if it provides a service. Otherwise, it
is a receiver peer. Trust information stored by a peer is assumed to be eﬃciently accessed over a DHT structure.
A peer cannot delete or damage its interaction history or trust information since this information about the
peer is stored by another peer (archiver).
3.1. Archiver
An archiver of a peer stores all trust information about the peer. Archiver of peer x is denoted by Ax , which
stores the following trust information about x:
• Fp (x) :Feedbacks given about x as a service provider
• Fr (x) :Feedbacks given by x as a service receiver
• Consistency (P C(x)) and trust ( T (x)) values for x
• Continuing interactions
Each feedback is stored as a tuple. Assuming fi (x, y) = (si (x, y), F C i (x, y)) is the tuple representing ith
feedback of x (service provider) given by y (service receiver), si (x, y) represents the satisfaction value of fi (x, y)
and F C i (x, y) represents the feedback consistency value of fi (x, y). An interaction may complete successfully,
may be terminated by the provider without completing the service (might be due to going oﬄine), or may be
attacked if the service provider behaves maliciously during interaction. According to these cases, the service
receiver assigns the satisfaction value as follows:

if the interaction is successful

 1,
0,
if x terminates the interaction
si (x, y) =


−1, if x is malicious during the interaction

(1)

An archiver may misbehave by providing false trust information about the archived peer. In the proposed model,
it is assumed that each peer has multiple archivers. Thus, such attacks can be prevented by cross-validation of
results from diﬀerent archivers.
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3.2. Feedback consistency
When a service receiver finishes its interaction with the service provider, it sends a feedback to the archiver
of the service provider. The archiver calculates a feedback consistency value. Feedback consistency measures
how similar a feedback is with the past feedbacks about a peer. Most studies in the literature [11,16,19,20] use
vector-based comparisons to measure the similarity between two specific peers, while we aim to compare a single
feedback value with all past feedbacks given about a peer. Thus, the vector-based comparison is not appropriate
for our purpose. In other words, feedback consistency measures the similarity between a feedback and all past
feedbacks about the evaluated peer. To evaluate this metric, the number of feedbacks with the same feedback
values is considered a measure of feedback consistency. Assuming x provides a service to y and, as a result,
i th interaction of x happens with y , the archiver of x (which is Ax ) calculates the feedback consistency as
follows:
[Fp (x) ∩ si (x, y)]
,
(2)
F C i (x, y) =
[Fp (x)]
where [Fp (x)] represents the number of feedbacks in Fp (x) and [Fp (x) ∩ si (x, y)] represents the number of
feedbacks that have the same satisfaction values in Fp (x) with the satisfaction value si (x, y).
3.3. Peer consistency
Peer consistency measures the consistency of a peer in terms of giving true feedbacks. Considering past feedbacks
of a peer y as a service receiver, feedback consistency values of all previous feedbacks in Fr (y) can be considered
a measure of peer consistency. Thus, we calculate peer consistency for peer y as follows:
∑
P C(y) =

F C i (∗,y)

fi (∗,y)∈Fr (y)

[Fr (y)]

,

(3)

where fi (∗, y) is the i th feedback given by y about a peer and F C i (∗, y) is its corresponding feedback
consistency value.
While feedback consistency measures a feedback’s similarity with the previous feedbacks about a peer,
peer consistency measures how good a peer is at providing consistent feedbacks.
3.4. Calculating trust value
The archiver of a peer calculates a trust value for the peer by evaluating the feedbacks given about the peer as
a service provider. When evaluating a feedback, feedback consistency and consistency of the feedback provider
are considered. The archiver of a peer performs a trust calculation after receiving a new feedback about the
peer. Assuming peer x provides its i th service to peer y and y sends its feedback fi (x, y) to Ax , the trust
value of x is calculated by Ax as follows:
Ti (x) =∝Ei (x,y) + (1− ∝) Ti−1 (x)

(4)

Ei (x,y) =si (x,y) F C i (x, y)P C(y),

(5)

where Ti (x) is the trust value of peer x after i th interaction, Ei (x, y) is evaluation of i th feedback about
peer x, and 0 <∝< 1 is a constant value to determine the eﬀect of the last feedback on the trust value.
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When calculating Ei (x, y) , consistency of the feedback ( F C i (x, y)) and consistency of the feedback provider
(i.e. consistency of the service receiver –P C(y)) are considered. In this way, a feedback has more eﬀect on
the trust value if it is consistent with the previous feedbacks and its provider is consistent. To be able to
bootstrap the network and give peers a chance to start interactions, each peer x is assigned to an initial trust
value T0 (x) = 0.2 in our model. Furthermore, ∝= 0.2 to balance the eﬀects of feedback history and the new
feedback. These values were selected after performing extensive experiments.
3.5. Starting an interaction
Figure 1a shows how an interaction is started in our model. As the first step of starting an interaction (i.e. file
download), the service receiver y queries the network to learn possible resource providers (Step 1). As a result
of this query, a list of service providers and their archivers are returned by the network. In this study, it is
assumed that all resource providers in the network can be learned with a single query. However, some network
infrastructures may return only a group of providers, which does not aﬀect our calculations. Then the service
receiver y queries all archivers of service providers returned in Step 1. For ease of explanation, only the service
provider x and its archiver Ax are shown in Figure 1a (Step 2). Ax returns x’s current trust value T (x) . If
this value is larger than a threshold value, y decides to send a request to x asking how much bandwidth it can
allocate (Step 3). When selecting service providers, the trust threshold value is set to 0.8 at first. If there is
no service provider having a larger trust value than the threshold, or the request of x is rejected by all service
providers, the threshold value is decreased to 0.6, 0.4, and 0.2 until a service provider is found and accepts
providing the service to x. In this way, x increases its chance of finding a service provider. If the threshold
value reaches 0, the search is stopped and the service request is canceled. However, the search can be stopped
at a higher threshold value if more trustworthy interactions are desired.
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Figure 1. Lifecycle of an interaction.

When y requests the resource, the service provider x queries y ’s consistency value ( P C(y)) from
its archiver Ay (Step 4). If its consistency is higher than a threshold, x determines the amount of bandwidth/resource to promise and returns its bandwidth promise to y (Step 5). After performing extensive evaluations, we set the threshold value for P C(y) as 0.5 in our model. If P C (y) > 0.5 , x promises bandwidth as
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a service provider to y . When calculating bandwidth promise, x considers its ongoing services and uses the
following equations:
pBW y =

P C (y)
×tBW x
tP C x

tP C x =

∑

P C (i),

(6)

(7)

i∈Rx

where tBW x is x’s total bandwidth, pBW y is the promised bandwidth for y , and tP C x is the sum of
consistency values of receiver peers that are currently receiving service from x, which are denoted by Rx . In
other words, x shares its total bandwidth fairly among its service requesters based on their peer consistency
values.
For ease of explanation, y requests service from only x in Figure 1a. However, in a general application,
y may collect bandwidth promises from several service providers and select the peer who promises the greatest
bandwidth.
3.6. Finalizing an interaction
Figure 1b shows how an interaction is finalized. When an interaction is completed or terminated, the receiver
peer y sends its satisfaction value (si (x, y)) about the interaction to the archiver(s) of the provider peer x
(Step 1). Ax calculates and stores feedback consistency ( F C i (x, y)) and trust (Ti (x)) values (Step 3). Then
Ax sends F C i (x, y) value to the service receiver’s archiver Ay (Step 3). Finally, Ay recalculates and stores
y ’s peer consistency value, P C(y) (Step 4). If y provides misleading feedbacks, F C i (x, y) will be low, which
will decrease P C(y) as well.

4. Experiment
To evaluate the proposed model, we implemented a simulation model based on the Peersim environment [1].
Peersim has cycle-based and event-based simulation capabilities. In this study, we designed a cycle-based
environment to model a P2P file download application. At the start of each cycle, peers may start new
interactions (i.e. file download), finish a completed interaction, or advance a continuing interaction. Each
simulation configuration is run five times for 1000 cycles. The presented statistical results are the average of
five runs. As stated in Section 3.4, T0 (x) =∝= 0.2 in Eq (3). Due to space limitations, we do not present
the experimental results that led to selecting these values. The most important statistics collected during
experiments are given in the Table. Among these statistics, startedServiceCount is collected at the beginning
of services but other statistics are collected after finishing services.
Table. Statistics collected in the simulation experiments.

Statistic
startedServices
succeededServices
maliciousServices
terminatedServices
maliciousFeedbacks
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Description
Number of services started in a cycle.
Number of good services finished in a cycle.
Number of malicious services finished in a cycle.
Number of services terminated in a cycle.
Number of malicious feedbacks for finished services in a cycle.
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4.1. Attacker model
In the experiments, we studied four types of attackers. A malicious peer’s behavior is determined according
to collaborating strategy and attacking frequency. Attackers may behave as either individuals or collaborators,
according to collaboration strategy. When attacking frequency is considered, attackers may behave as either
naı̈ve or hypocritical.
4.1.1. Individual malicious peers
Individual malicious peers attack individually and do not collaborate with others. There are two types of them:
• Naı̈ve individual malicious peers: A naı̈ve individual malicious peer always serves infected resources (files)
and gives misleading feedbacks.
• Hypocritical individual malicious peers: This type of attacker serves infected resources and gives misleading feedbacks to its victims with a given probability.

4.1.2. Collaborative malicious peers
Collaborative malicious peers behave as a collaboration group and work as a group to manipulate the system.
They always serve good files and true feedbacks to each other, but might serve infected files and give malicious
feedbacks to others. When submitting a malicious feedback, collaborators give a high recommendation if the
feedback is about a collaborator; otherwise they give a bad recommendation. Thus, they try to increase trust
values of each other in the system. We define two types of collaborators:
• Naı̈ve collaborative malicious peers: A naı̈ve collaborative malicious peer always provides infected files
and gives misleading feedbacks to others.
• Hypocritical collaborative malicious peers: This type of attacker performs the same attacks as the naı̈ve
collaborative malicious peer but within an attack probability.
In the simulation experiments, the attack probability of hypocritical malicious peers is selected as
20%. This means that the hypocritical attacker serves infected resources and gives misleading feedbacks at
a probability of 0.2.
5. Results
In this section, we present the experimental results of the proposed model. In the experiments, malicious
download rates, malicious feedback rates, the bootstrapping phase of the network, and an extreme scenario
with a 50% malicious network are analyzed. Lastly, a comparison is done with the Eigentrust model [3]. In all
simulation experiments except the Eigentrust comparison, the peer population consists of 10,000 peers. In the
first three experiments, attackers occupy 20% of the network.
5.1. Malicious download rate
As a first experiment, we evaluate the eﬀect of the proposed model on decreasing malicious download rate, which
is measured as the ratio of malicious downloads to all downloads. Each simulation is run by using the trust
model and then without any trust model, and then results are compared to understand how much the model
decreases the malicious download rate. The run without any trust evaluation is the base case to understand
how much attacks can aﬀect system performance. Figure 2a shows the results of the simulation without a trust
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ŞAHİN and CAN/Turk J Elec Eng & Comp Sci

evaluation. When a trust model is not used, the eﬀect of naı̈ve attackers increases continuously. As the naı̈ve
attackers collect more files, they receive more download requests and their attack capability increases. After 800
cycles, more than half of the downloads are flagged as malicious in the naı̈ve attacker simulation. In hypocritical
malicious peers, malicious download rate is stable at about 4%–5%, as in Figure 2a. Since they occupy 20% of
the whole peer population and their attack probability is 0.2, their eﬀect in all downloads is limited to 4%–5%.
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Figure 2. Malicious download rate (MDR) versus cycles (CYC).

Figure 2b presents the results when the trust model is used. In the early stages of the experiment, the
trust model detects naı̈ve malicious peers and malicious download rate decreases dramatically to 0.5% after
100 cycles. Considering cycles 900–1000, the successful download rate increases from 45% to 99.5% for naı̈ve
attackers compared to the no-trust case. Since the attack rate is low in hypocritical attackers, the increase in
successful download rate is low for hypocritical attackers. The trust model increases the successful download
rate from 96% to 99.5%.
As a result of these experiments, we can conclude that the model identifies naı̈ve and hypocritical attackers
after 50 cycles and decreases the malicious download rate.
5.2. Analyzing bootstrap of model
In order to observe eﬀectiveness of the model in the bootstrapping phase of the network, we analyzed the first
50 cycles of the experiment. As seen in Figure 3a, at the beginning, malicious peers can aﬀect the system easily
without the trust model. Malicious download rates ramp up in the first 5 cycles, and then increase slowly in
naı̈ve attackers. Figure 3b shows the bootstrapping phase of the network with the trust model. Similar to
Figure 3a, the malicious download rate peaks in the first 5 cycles, but then the rate starts to fall with the help
of the trust model. After 20 cycles, the malicious download rate drops to below 0.2% and 2% for naı̈ve and
hypocritical attackers, respectively. As more trust information is gathered by archivers, good and malicious
peers can be identified better in the later cycles. The model can easily exclude malicious peers, since all trust
information can be accessed by all peers using the DHT-based network. However, it makes the trust model
vulnerable to malicious feedbacks in the early cycles. After 5 cycles, the feedback consistency concept works
properly and malicious download rates drop.
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Figure 3. Malicious download rate (MDR) versus cycles (CYC) in the bootstrapping phase.

5.3. Malicious feedback rate
To further analyze the trust model, we analyzed the feedback and peer consistency concepts and performed
experiments on these concepts. Figure 4a shows malicious feedback rates over time when consistency is oﬀ within
the trust model. Malicious feedback rates take variable values under 30% for naı̈ve attackers. Hypocritical
attackers’ malicious feedback rate stays stable at around 5%.
Figure 4b shows malicious feedback rates when consistency is activated. Naı̈ve attackers are detected and
isolated from the system in the early cycles (the lines of naı̈ve individuals and collaborators overlap). Malicious
feedback rate of hypocritical attackers stays stable over time, but their rate is decreased by nearly 20%–40%
compared to Figure 4a. Although malicious feedbacks of hypocritical attackers are not eliminated substantially,
the successful download rate increases from 95.6% to 99.5%, as discussed in Section 5.1. Thus, their eﬀect on
the whole system remains negligible.
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Figure 4. Malicious feedback rate (MFR) versus cycles (CYC).
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5.4. Extremely malicious environments
A trust model should robustly mitigate attacks, even if the ratio of malicious peers is excessive in the network.
In this experiment, 50% of the network is configured as malicious to analyze the trust model’s performance in an
extremely malicious environment. Figure 5a shows the malicious download rates observed in this experiment.
Hypocritical collaborative attackers can deceive the trust model and convince good peers to download and then
continue malicious uploads. Although the malicious download rate reaches 20% for naı̈ve collaborators in the
first 50 cycles, it quickly falls below 1% after 200 cycles. Naı̈ve and hypocritical individuals can be detected
earlier than collaborators.
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Figure 5. Malicious download (MDR) and feedback (MFR) rates for the extreme scenario.

When we analyze the malicious feedback rates in Figure 5b, hypocritical attackers can disseminate more
malicious feedbacks than naı̈ve attackers. Since hypocritical individuals occupy 50% of all the population and
their attack probability is 0.2%, we observe a steady 10% malicious feedback rate. Hypocritical collaborators
provide malicious feedbacks only when interacting with good peers (50% of all peers). Thus, their malicious
feedback rate remains around 5%. On the other hand, our trust model works well for naı̈ve attackers and
eﬀectively prevents their malicious feedbacks after 100 cycles.
5.5. Comparison with Eigentrust algorithm
In this section, we compare our model with the best-known trust management algorithm, Eigentrust [3]. We
implemented Eigentrust on the Peersim environment. As in our model, cycle-based simulation is performed to
make a fair comparison. File distribution and download attempt ratios are the same for both models. Malicious
peer counts, attack rates of hypocritical attackers, and collaborative activity of peers are also applied in the
same way for both models. We evaluate the models based on two diﬀerent parameters: malicious download
rates and started download rates. Since reducing malicious feedbacks is not Eigentrust’s primary goal, malicious
feedback rates of the two models are not compared. In this section, all experiments are run with 1000 peers for
1000 cycles. In Eigentrust simulations, 30 pretrusted peers exist in the network.
All attacker models are applied in both models separately and their performance is observed. Our model
performs better than the Eigentrust algorithm in all scenarios. Figure 6 shows malicious download rates for
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diﬀerent attacker models. In all cases, malicious download rates decrease close to 0% with our model. The
Eigentrust algorithm also performs well, but it rarely falls under 2% malicious download rate. An important
feature of a trust model is that the model should not decrease interactions and peers should be able to start
interactions with reasonable trust level. Figure 7 shows the ratio of started interactions to all download attempts.
While our model allows interactions to start in 70%–90% of all interactions, Eigentrust allows less than 40%.
This shows that our model enables more interactions to start while keeping malicious download rates at a
low level. In naı̈ve attackers, since 20% of the peers are malicious and our model generally does not allow
malicious peers to receive services, started download ratio remains around 80%. The same situation is observed
with hypocritical attackers proportional to their attack rate. With the hypocritical attackers, about 95% of
download intention is allowed in our model, while Eigentrust allows at most 40% of downloads. Thus, we can
conclude that our model provides security by blocking download attempts of malicious peers, not good peers.
6. Conclusion
A consistency-based trust model is proposed to identify malicious peers in P2P networks. The feedback and
peer consistency concepts of the trust model are robust methods for detecting malicious peers. The trust model
is tested in the Peersim simulation environment for a file simulation application. Networks of 10,000 peers are
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Figure 6. Comparison of malicious download rates (MDR) without a trust model (NaN) and with both models
(Eigentrust and consistency-based trust models).
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modeled for a better simulation of large networks. Individual and collaborative attackers are simulated in naı̈ve
and hypocritical behaviors. Malicious download and feedback rates for four types of attackers are observed in
the experiments. The simulation experiments show that the trust model decreases malicious download rates in
all cases. Even with a 50% malicious network, the model mitigates the malicious download rate. In the worst
case, the malicious download rate stays around 10% for hypocritical collaborators in a 50% malicious network,
which is a promising result for such an extreme environment. Comparison with the Eigentrust algorithm [3]
showed that the model decreases malicious download rates more than Eigentrust does, while allowing more
downloads than Eigentrust does.
Although the malicious feedbacks of naı̈ve attackers are decreased, hypocritical attackers can convince
good peers and continue malicious feedbacks. This shows us an improvement opportunity for future studies.
In future work, we plan to focus on hypocritical behavior in extremely malicious environments and mitigate
malicious feedbacks and downloads with the help of new metrics and concepts. As another research direction,
models based on machine learning can be studied to overcome these problems.
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